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KANT'S CRITIQUE OF MYSTICISM:
(1) The Critical Dreams Human reason was not given strong enough wings to part clouds so high above us, clouds which withhold from our eyes the secrets of the other world.1
I. The Traditional Myth
Kant's life is traditionally portrayed as falling into two rather distinct parts. The period prior to 1770 is the "pre-Critical" period, while that from 1770 onwards is the "Critical" period. The turning-point is placed in the year 1770 because it was in this year that Kant published his Inaugural Dissertation (for his newly gained post of Professor of Logic and Metaphysics at the University of Kînigsberg). In this work, entitled On the Form and Principles of the Sensible and Intelligible World, he proposed for the first time that space and time should be regarded as "forms of intuition", which we human subjects read into experience, rather than as self-subsisting attributes of nature, which we read off from the objects we experience. The typical "textbook" account of Kant's life usually declares that the pre-Critical Kant was a Leibnizian dogmatist, trained in the school of Wolffian rationalism, and was as much (or more) interested in natural science as in philosophy, but that sometime around 1770 Kant was suddenly "awakened" from his dogmatic slumbers by his reflection on David Hume's philosophy.2 Some commentators go so far as to say not only that "Kant and Hume aim at the very same thing", but that "all the specific doctrines of Kant's critical enterprise are intimately bound up with Hume's influence on Kant."3 Although it is difficult to determine the exact nature and date of this dramatic awakening, there is no doubt that Kant was familiar with Hume's ideas by the early 1760s, because in 1766 he published a book in which, so the story goes, he adopts This tradition, in my judgment, contains at least as much myth as truth. While it is true that Kant never mentions his mature theory of the transcendental ideality of space and time before 1770, it is not true that he owes the theory to Hume (whose theory of space and time bears little resemblance to Kant's) . Nor is it legitimate to equate this doctrine (expounded in its official form in the Aesthetic of the first Critique) with the term "Critical", as is implied by the dating of the Critical period from 1770. On the contrary, Kant associates his "new method of thought, namely, that we can know a priori of things only what we ourselves put into them", not with the Critical method, but with his new "Copernican" insight, which he believed would enable him to revolutionize philosophy [CPR xvi-xviii]. His description and use of criticism as a philosophical method is quite distinct from its application to problems in metaphysics by means of the "Copernican hypothesis". Thus, when Kant gave instructions to the editor of his minor writings to ignore all those written before 1770,5 he was not defining the starting point of his Critical method, but rather that of his use of the Copernican hypothesis. If labels must be given to the periods before and after 1770, they should therefore be referred to as Kant's "pre-Copernican" and "post-Copernican" periods.
Before we proceed it is crucial to have a thorough understanding of Kant's mature 3 3 conception of "criticism" or "critique" (i.e. Kritik), as it is elaborated in CPR. In the first edition Preface, Kant describes his "age" (i.e. the Enlightenment) as "the age of criticism", during which reason accords "sincere respect...only to that which has been able to sustain the test of free and open examination" [CPR Axin]. This "habit of thought" can be trusted, however, only if it also submits to its own "tribunal" of criticism [Axi-xii] . Thus "the subject-matter of our critical enquiry" (i.e. of the entire Critical System) is reason itself [Axiv] , and its "first task" is "to discover the sources and conditions of the possibility of such criticism" [Axxi] . This means that the questions addressed Instead, only by first examining "the very nature of knowledge itself" can we answer reason's questions in such a way that will provide solutions to the problems of metaphysics [Axiii-xiv] .
In the second edition Preface Kant not only describes more fully the subjectmatter of the particular type of critique he plans to engage in, but also explains more clearly the nature of the Critical method. Metaphysics will be "purified by criticism and established once for all": the purification is "merely negative, warning us that we must never venture with speculative reason beyond the limits of experience"; but the establishment is positive inasmuch as it "removes an obstacle which stands in the way of the employment of practical reason" [CPR xxiv-xxv]. In other words, the scope of reason's speculative (i.e. theoretical) employment is narrowed by tying it to sensibility, but this frees metaphysics to be established on the firmer foundation of reason's practical 4 4 employment--i.e. on morality [xxv] . The Critical method, therefore, is intended to establish limits, but to do so for both negative and positive purposes. The former can be seen when Kant refers to "our critical distinction between two modes of representation, the sensible and the intellectual" and immediately adds "and of the resulting limitation...";7 likewise, he argues that non-contradictory doctrines of freedom and morality are "possible only in so far as criticism...has limited all that we can theoretically know to mere appearances" [xxix] . The positive benefit of such limitations is that they enable us to avoid "dogmatism" (defined here as "the preconception that it is possible to make headway in metaphysics without a previous criticism of pure reason"), which "is the source of all that [sceptical] unbelief...which wars against morality" [xxx] . Indeed, Kant goes so far as to say that "all objections to morality and religion will be for ever silenced" [xxxi], because his critique will "sever the root of materialism, fatalism, atheism, free-thinking, fanaticism, and superstition...as well as of idealism and scepticism" [xxxiv] .
Throughout the rest of CPR Kant repeats many of these same claims about the nature of criticism in its special, philosophical form. In most of their occurrences the words "critical", "criticism" and "critique" are used in close connection with some mention of the limitations of knowledge.8 The only interesting exception is that on several occasions he adds that criticism serves as a middle way between the opposite extremes of dogmatism and scepticism [CPR 22-23,A388-389, 784-785,789,797].
Indeed, this epitomizes Kant's association of the Critical method with synthesis, which he claims always takes the trichotomous form of "(1) a condition, (2) a conditioned, (3) the concept arising from the union of the conditioned with its condition".9 And of course, the most basic example of his use of this type of distinction is his division of the Critical System into three Critiques. This brief analysis of Kant's understanding of his Critical method reveals that he 5 5 never associates it directly with the Copernican hypothesis, but instead, with several key distinctions. The Critical method is, for Kant, the method of striking a middle way between two extremes ("a third step", as he calls it in CPR 789 [see also 177, 194, 196, 264, 315, 794] Thus it is closely associated with "the distinction between the transcendental and the empirical" [81] , as well as with that between speculative (theoretical) and practical (moral) employments of reason, or perspectives.10 Although certain apparently sceptical claims have to be made on the way, the ultimate purpose of criticism for Kant is positive:
to lead to the foundation of metaphysics upon solid (non-speculative, moral) grounds.
A careful reading of Kant's works reveals that traces of this Critical way of doing philosophy are evident throughout most of his works, from the earliest essays on metaphysics and natural philosophy to the latest essays on history, religion, and other subjects.11 Indeed, it is the fact that he used this method to develop and expound the implications of his Copernican hypothesis that gives lasting value to the theories which arise out of it, and not vice versa. In this paper, however, I will not attempt to provide a thoroughgoing proof of the ubiquity of the Critical method in Kant's writings. Instead I
will concentrate on what I believe is the most neglected (and/or misunderstood) book in the corpus of Kant's writings, namely the above-mentioned Dreams. In the next section I will sketch the contents of this book, after which (in section III) I will draw attention to its Critical character and discuss its role in Kant's discovery of the Copernican hypothesis. Finally, I will make some brief suggestions in section IV as to the relation between Dreams and the Critical System itself. This will lead directly to the sequel to this paper [see note 6], in which I will consider in more detail the nature of Kant's "Critical mysticism", which was envisaged first in Dreams and was to be brought to full "spirit" signifies. But, as I have often used it myself, and have heard others using it, something must be understood by it, be this something mere fancy or reality.
To this rather Wittgensteinian remark he adds that "the conception of spiritual nature cannot be drawn from experience", though its "hidden sense" can be drawn "out of its but...in the will of others outside of ourselves." The fact that our actions are motivated not only by selfishness, but also by duty and benevolence, reveals that "we are dependent upon the rule of the will of all" [335(64)]; and "the sensation of this dependence"--i.e. our "sense of morality"--suggests that "the community of all thinking beings" is governed by "a moral unity, and a systematic constitution according to purely spiritual laws." Thus, "because the morality of an action concerns the inner state of the spirit", its effect can be fully realized not in the empirical world, but "only in the immediate communion of spirits" [336(65)].
In reply to the possible objection that, given this view of the spirit-world, "the scarcity of apparitions" seems "extraordinary", Kant stresses that "the conceptions of the one world are not ideas associated with those of the other world"; so even if we have a "clear and perspicuous" spiritual conception, this cannot be regarded as "an object of actual [i.e. material] sight and experience."16 However, he freely admits that a person, being both material and immaterial, can become conscious of the influences of the spirit-world even in this life. For spiritual ideas...stir up those pictures which are related to them and awake analogous ideas of our senses.
These, it is true, would not be spiritual conceptions themselves, but yet their symbols....
Thus it is not improbable that spiritual sensations can pass over into consciousness if they act upon correlated ideas of the senses. [338-9(69-70)]
Even "our higher concepts of reason" need to "clothe themselves" in, "as it were, a bodily garment to make themselves clear", as when "the geometrician represents time by a line" [339(69-70) ]. An actual apparition, which might "indicate a disease, because it presupposes an altered balance of the nerves", is unusual because it is based not on a simple analogy, but on "a delusion of the imagination", in which "a true spiritual influence" is perceived in imagined "pictures...which assume the appearance of Before...we had flown on the butterfly-wings of metaphysics, and there conversed with spiritual beings. Now...we find ourselves again on the ground of experience and common sense. Happy, if we look at it as the place allotted to us, which we can leave with impunity, and which contains everything to satisfy us as long as we hold fast to the useful. This final chapter of Dreams ends with a concise (and entirely Critical) explanation of the positive aspect of this otherwise negative conclusion. The fact that 16 16 "philosophic knowledge is impossible in the case under consideration" need cause no concern (neither for the metaphysician nor for the mystic) as long as we recognize that "such knowledge is dispensable and unnecessary", because reason does not need to know such things [372(120)]. "The vanity of science" fools us into believing that "a proof from experience of the existence of such things" is required. "But true wisdom is the companion of simplicity, and as, with the latter, the heart rules the understanding, it generally renders unnecessary the great preparations of scholars, and its aims do not need such means as can never be at the command of all men." The true philosophy, which Kant always believed would confirm common sense, and therefore would be attainable for everyone (unlike a speculative dependence on theoretical proofs or mystical apparitions, each available to only a few individuals), should be based on "immediate moral precepts"--that is, on a "moral faith" which "guides [the "righteous soul"] to his extremes is exemplified by Kant's choice in the Preface to "hold on to the useful", even though this is not exactly how Kant later described his choice to steer critically between the extremes of dogmatism and scepticism. The Critical distinction between the theoretical and the practical, whose most obvious application is to the distinction between the first two Critiques, is foreshadowed by the conclusions to the two parts of Dreams, the first of which is theoretical and the second, practical. The attitude expressed in the first Chapter, that "spirits" are theoretically possible, but can never be proved to exist, is reminiscent of the standpoint adopted in the Dialectic of CPR, where all "ideas of reason" are treated similarly.21 Even the second Chapter, where Kant is letting his metaphysical imagination run wild, contains an interesting parallel: Kant's suggestion that the inner state of spirits is primarily important in its connection with morality is completely consistent with his later decision to regard morality as the proper foundation for metaphysics. (The same point is emphasized in the last chapter, where the true basis for belief in spirits is said to rest on morality rather than speculation.) And the scepticism Kant adopts in Chapter Three is not unlike that which he sometimes adopts in the Dialectic of CPR (in both cases as a temporary measure to guard against unwarranted speculation).22
The subordination of the theoretical (i.e. speculative) to the practical and the judicial, formulating his ideas for CPR, yet after it was completed he suddenly realized the need for a second Critique, and after that, the need for a third. However, the fact that Kant could apply all the Critical tools in 1766 to write Dreams makes it very difficult to believe that he would fumble around for fifteen more years, and then suddenly turn into a prolific genius. Rather, it suggests that Kant may well have wanted to have the plan for his entire philosophical System more or less complete in his mind before even starting the long task of committing it to paper. The need for a fifteen year gap between Dreams and CPR, which included his long "decade of silence", becomes more understandable if we regard Kant as formulating in his mind during this time not just the first Critique, but his entire System--though obviously, all the details concerning the precise form it would take had not entirely crystallized by 1781.24 The traditional view fails to take account of the fact that writers do not always say everything they know about their plans for future undertakings, and also ignores the importance of Kant's emphasis on keeping to specific architectonic patterns.25
The one aspect of Kant's transcendental philosophy which is conspicuously absent in Dreams is the cornerstone of the whole System, the Copernican hypothesis (i.e. the assumption that objectivity is based on a priori subjectivity, rather than vice versa). And this had begun to dawn on him by the time he wrote his Inaugural Dissertation in 1770, in which time and space are regarded as "forms of intuition" not inherent in the object itself.
Thus the crucial question is: if "criticism" was the original distinguishing character of For this inner meaning, the internal sense, i.e., the symbolic relation of all things told there to the spirit-world, is, as he fancies, the kernel of its value, the rest only the shell."
Kant uses precisely the same analogy in his own investigation of "pure religion" in Religion within the Bounds of Bare Reason, except that the "inner meaning" is derived from practical reflection (the Critical mode of dreaming?) rather than from dreams about the spirit-world. (1) The general Critical method of finding the limits which define the "middle way" between unthinking acceptance of the status quo (dogmatism) and unbelieving doubt as to the validity of the entire tradition (scepticism).
(2) The general Copernican insight that the most fundamental aspects of human knowledge (that which makes it objective) have their source in the human subject as a priori forms, not vice versa (i.e. time, space, etc., are not absolute realities which have their roots entirely in the object, as had previously been assumed). This, of course, was the seed which (when fertilized by the Critical method) gave rise to the entire System of "transcendental philosophy".28 (3) The particular application of (1) to itself (i.e. reason's criticism of reason itself).
(4) The particular application of (2) to the problem of the necessary connection between 23 23 a cause and its effect.
As stated in section I, we can see (1) operating in varying degrees in almost all of Kant's writings [see note 11] . Indeed, his lifelong acceptance of (1) is clearly the intellectual background against which alone his great philosophical achievements could be made (and as such, is the source of his genius). Although his ability to make conscious use of this method certainly developed gradually during his career, receiving its first fullfledged application in Dreams, neither Swedenborg (the dogmatist) nor Hume (the sceptic) can be given the credit for this. The Critical method is not something Kant learned from these (or any other) philosophers, but rather, is the natural Tao through which Kant read, and in reading, transformed, their ideas.29 If anyone is to be thanked, it should be his parents, and in particular, his mother. 30 Kant's recognition of (4) as one of the crucial questions to be answered by his new philosophical System, is, by contrast, clearly traceable to Hume's influence. In fact, his discussion of Hume's impact on his development in Prolegomena 260(8) undoubtedly refers only to this narrow sense of "awakening": Kant is telling us nothing more than that his "recollection" of Hume helped him to recognize that causality cannot be treated as an intellectual principle, so that it must be justified (if at all) in some other way. The fact that Kant uses the term "recollection" indicates a fairly late date (probably 1772 [see note 4]) for this dramatic event. For Kant is suggesting that (4) came to him as a result of remembering the scepticism of Hume ("the first spark of light") which had begun influencing his thinking about ten years before. However, if Kant's famous "awakening" is only a dramatized account of his discovery of (4), then such references to Hume do not answer the more fundamental question, the answer to which we have been seeking here:
Where did Kant get the idea of using (2) as the insight with which to solve all such philosophical problems?
Kant's discovery of (2) came in several fairly well-defined steps, mostly from (4) , while that for which the antimony is responsible refers to (3). Accordingly, Kant says the antinomy showed him the need for a critique of reason, whereas he says Hume gave a "new direction" [Prolegomena 260 (8) ] to his speculative research (thus implying he had already begun working on that critique). The traditional view that these refer to the same experience arises only because he uses the same metaphor to describe both developments.
The second question arises once we recognize the obviously close connection between Kant's metaphor of being awoken from sleep and the metaphor of dreaming which permeates the entirety of Dreams (even its title). If Kant's awakening really happened only in 1768 (via the antinomies) or in 1772 (via Hume's scepticism)--or even at both times--then Kant's comments would seem to imply that Dreams itself dates from the period of "dogmatic slumber" from which he only later awoke. Yet even those who have failed to recognize the Critical elements in Dreams would agree that it is not the work of a sleeping dogmatist! So how could Kant's metaphor apply to anything which happened after he wrote this book? Although I will not presume to give the final answer to this difficult question, I will venture to offer a plausible suggestion, based on the explanation of Kant's development given above.
Criticism is the middle path between dogmatism and scepticism. It is the tool with which Kant believed he could preserve the truth and value of both methods and yet do away with the errors into which each inevitably falls. The Critical mind will therefore always allow itself to be "tempted", as it were, by the two extremes which it ultimately seeks to overcome; but in the process of becoming more and more refined, it will appear at one moment to be more dogmatic and at another to be more sceptical (just as we observed Kant's mind to be in the text of Dreams). In other words, the Critical method does not do away with scepticism and dogmatism, so much as use them as opposing forces to guide its insight further along the spiral path towards the central point of pure
Critique. Now in order to be healthy a human being needs both sleep and waking; and in the same way, we could develop Kant's analogy one step further by saying that the healthy (Critical) philosopher needs a sufficient dose of both dogmatism and scepticism.
Scepticism functions like an alarm clock to remind philosophers when it is time to stop their dogmatic dreaming and return to the normal waking life of criticism. The Critical philosopher will naturally experience many experiences of this type, just as a normal person is often surprised to wake up in the middle of a dream, yet will dream again the next night. Thus, the confusion caused by Kant's various references to his awakening from dogmatic slumbers may be best explained by regarding each as equally legitimate and equally important to his development.
We have seen that Hume's influence was never such as to convert Kant to Critical method, nor about the source of his "Copernican" assumption (which I take to be the two most fundamental aspects of his mature philosophical System). Moreover, they also fail to account for the unique (Humean?) character of Dreams. In section III of this paper I will propose an alternative explanation of Kant's development, which makes up for these and other inadequacies of the traditional view. principles', had to be generalized, and when it was finally 'broadened', the general critical
